Karaye v. Wike (2009)

ALHAJI MOHAMMED KARAYE V. LEVI WIKE

IN SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

SC.312/2009

On Friday, 21st June 2019

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C. (Presided)

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C. (Read the Leading Judgment)

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C. 

BETWEEN

ALHAJI MOHAMMED KARAYE

(Trading under the name and style of

United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)

AND

1. LEVI WIKE

2. SOLOMON OHABIKO

3. INNOCENT OSI

(Trading under the name and style of

United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)

…………………….A…………………….

EKO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant was a founding member of United Livestock Dealers Enterprises, off Mile 3 Market, Diobu, Port Harcourt. In 1973 United Livestock Dealers Enterprises (hereinafter called “the Union”) was given a piece of land at Mile 1, Biobu Market by the Port Harcourt City Council. Between 1975 and 1983 the appellant, as the plaintiff, was the Vice-Chairman of the Union. It is averred in paragraph 5 of the 2nd amended statement of claim that the Executive Committee of the Union, in which the appellant, as the plaintiff, was the Vice-Chairman did not maintain “proper account”. A new Executive Committee was constituted in 1983, and the appellant was appointed/elected “the treasurer of the union -” a post he held until the disagreement within the Union arose.

The respondents, as defendants, had pleaded in paragraph 11 of the further amended statement of defence that the appellant, as the treasurer, “could not account for the sum of N9,353.10 – which was in his possession.” They relied “on the audit report of the firm of Chartered Accountant, namely: Tamunoibi & Co. of Azikiwe Road, Port Harcourt to show that this amount was not accounted for at the time of audit.” The respondents further alleged that “in 1982 (the appellant) paid N200.00 given to him by the Union” to pay at the Land’s Office to secure the Union’s interest over a piece of land and that he, instead, “obtained the receipt in his own name.”In what appears their justification for terminating the appellants’ membership of the union, the respondents averred inter-alia in paragraph 11 of the further amended statement of defence that by “a letter dated 29th October, 1984, after the Union found (the appellant) was unable to account for huge sums of money that came into his possession for which he (was) being charged to court,” they decided to terminate his membership of the Union. In other words, the appellant was expelled from the union during the pendency of the case at the Magistrate’s Court in which he was being prosecuted

for theft of the Union’s moneys in his possession that he could not account for. The auditors, in exhibits J and K, had found that the appellant could not account for N9,353.10.

The immediate cause of action on which the appellant initiated the suit at the trial court against the respondent was his expulsion from the Union for his inability to account for some Union moneys in his possession. The expulsion of the appellant, during the pendency of criminal charges for theft

…………………….B…………………….

against him, was, as it appears, on account of the audit reports in exhibits J and K. At the trial High Court the appellant’s claims against the respondents were set out thus, in paragraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of claim–

19. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants jointly and severally are as follows:-

A declaration that both the plaintiff and the defendants are members of the “United Livestock Dealers Enterprises” off Mile 3market, Diobu, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, and the purported expulsion of the plaintiff from the United Livestock Dealers Enterprises by the defendants is unlawful, unconstitutional, contrary to the Rules of natural justice and fair hearing, null and void and of no effect and the plaintiff is still a member thereof and entitled to carry on his business and activities along with the people trading under him at the separate site for Livestock Dealers, off Nkpolu Oroworukwo Road, Mile 3 Diobu,a. Port Harcourt.

A declaration that the piece or parcel of land lying and situate off Mile 3 Market, Diobu, Port Harcourt known and called “separate site for Livestock Dealers” belongs to both the plaintiff and their follower jointly and severally

b. and That in view of the incessant threats to peace and tranquility between both parties to this action, the plaintiff seek an order of this

c. honourable court partitioning the said piece or parcel of land between the plaintiff and the defendant.

That the said partition in paragraph above be carried out by the Nigerian Police and that the said land should be partitioned into two equal halves for the benefit and use of the plaintiff

d. and the defendants.

ALTERNATIVELY, an injunction restraining the defendants, their privies, servants and agents members of the United Livestock Enterprises.

N600,000.00 general damages for inferences, loss of union benefits, dealers unlawful loss of from preventing the plaintiff and his followers/attachees/people trading under him from the use of the union land known and called separate site for Livestock Dealers and from interfering in any other manner with the plaintiff’s activities (or the activities of his 11-followersattachees/people trading under him as business/customers and for inconveniences cause by thee. defendants against the plaintiff.

…………………….C…………………….

The trial High Court entered judgment in terms only of paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim other reliefs claimed by the appellant, that is: paragraph

19(b) – of the 2nd further amended statement of claim were denied to the appellant.The granting of relief (19(a) prompted the respondent’s appeal to the lower court. The appellant also cross-appealed the dismissal of his reliefs 19(b) – including the alternative injunctive relief. The substantive appeal of the respondents was dismissed. The lower court, upon dismissing the substantive appeal, found no further need to consider the cross-appeal. At page 220 of the record the lower court stated its position on the cross-appeal firmly thus-

Consideration of the cross-appeal will amount to an academic exercise which a court of law must not indulge on. With the decision of the (trial) court having been affirmed, the respondent (the appellant herein) remains a full fledged member of the Union entitled to all the rights and privileges being a member

of the Union confers on him. The reliefs sought by the cross-appellant in his cross-appeal arose because of his expulsion by the cross respondents from the Union.With the decision of the (trial) court as affirmed herein that the expulsion was null and void, consideration of the cross-appeal becomes hypothetical and unavailing to the cross- appellant.

The stance of the lower court did not address the fear of the appellant, that is – should the respondents decide to flout the trial court’s declaration what sanction would avail him against the respondents?

This further appeal is premised on the foregoing decision of the lower court. The two issues canvassed by the appellant in this appeal are, in nutshell, predicated on the failure of the lower court to consider the issues raised before it in the cross-appeal,and the failure of the lower court to grant the reliefs sought bythe appellant. Let me pause awhile to take what appears to be a preliminary objection.

The respondents have raised a fundamental point which must, before any other thing, be resolved quickly. That is, that the capacity the suit was instituted and determined by the trial court. The respondents, arguing this point,

…………………….D…………………….

contended that the appellant reverted, at page 132 of the record, to attaching “(Trading under the name and style of United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)” to the name he filed the notice of appeal after the judgment. The notice of appeal that initiated the cross-appeal at the lower court was served on the respondents. The respondents herein, as the cross-respondents raised no objection to the cross-appeal. Against what appears to be belated preliminary objection to the appeal at the lower court, Mr. Uwom, of the counsel to the appellant, submits correctly, in my view, that the Supreme Court by dint of section 233 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, does not have jurisdiction to entertain the preliminary objection; in so far as the issue is tied to the competence of the suit at the trial court or the appeal at the lower court. This issue rightly belongs to the lower court, and should have been raised at the lower court. The respondents could only raise this issue upon a notice of appeal by way of a ground of appeal upon leave sought and granted to raise a fresh issue in this court. The issue, no doubt,

is incompetent having been raised without notice of appeal to this court and upon a ground of appeal, for which leave should have been previously granted to the respondents, to raise as a fresh issue: Ogundare v. Ogunlowo (1997) 5 SCNJ 281 at 286, (1997) 6NWLR (Pt.509) 360. The respondents did not raise this issue either as a preliminary objection to the appellant’s cross-appeal or as agrievance in their appeal at the lower court. This issue does not relate to any ground of appeal in this court. It is just arising out of the blues from nowhere really. The issue being incompetent is hereby discountenanced.

Now to the complaint that appellant’s cross-appeal was not considered; a cross-appeal, by its nature, is a separate and independent appeal. It is not an appendage to the main appeal, and its purpose is to enable the respondent in the main appeal to appeal against the same judgment or part thereof that he (the respondent) is aggrieved with: Magna Maritime Services Ltd & Anor v. Oteju & Anor (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 55, (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 517; Akpan v. Bob & Ors (2010) 4 – 7 SC (Pt. ii) 57, (2010) 17 NWLR(Pt. 1223) 421; Lafia Local Govt. v. Executive Govenor, Nasarawa State & Ors (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94.

The grouse of the appellant, as the cross-appellant at the lowercourt, is that the trial court annulled his expulsion from the Union

…………………….E…………………….

without considering his other reliefs in paragraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of claim. He complains further that the lower court failed to consider/pronounce on the issue he had raised in the cross-appeal. Mr. Uwom, learned counsel to the appellant, contends that at the lower court the appellant, in his cross-appeal, raised the issue of the trial court’s failure to grant the injunctive relief, the alternative relief, as a consequential order to give bite, force or efficacy to the declaratory relief granted in favour of the appellant and that the grant of the consequential order was necessary to prevent the respondents’ further infraction or interference with his right as a member of the Union.

The respondents submit that the relief in paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim granted to the appellant was the principal or substantive claim and that all other claims therein were ancillary to that claim. It is further submitted for the respondents that those other claims, being alternative to the claim in paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of

claim; the grant of the principal relief made it unnecessary, on the authority of Onayemi v. Idowu (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 306 at336, for the two courts below to embark on further consideration of the alternative claims.

The respondents seem to get it wrong in their submission that the reliefs claimed in paragraph 19(b) – of the 2nd further amended statement of claim are ancillary to the relief in paragraph 19(a) thereof and that those other reliefs are alternative reliefs to the relief in paragraph 19 (a). I, however, agree that the relief immediately after relief was no doubt expressly made as analternative relief to the reliefs seeking the partitioning of the Union property. That alternative relief appears to be in relation only to the reliefs in paragraph & of the 2nd further amended statement of claim. In other words, the injunctive relief was not, and could not have been, an alternative relief to the reliefs as perparagraph 19 & of the 2nd further amended statement of claim.

…………………….F…………………….

Having made this clarification; I agree, in principle, that where a party to an action has proved his substantive claim there would be no justification to embark on the consideration of his alternative claim, and that alternative claims are considered and granted where the grant of the substantive claim is either not feasible, unjust, or inequitable: Onayemi v. Idowu (supra); Ibafon Company Ltd. v. Nigerian Port Plc (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 667) 86.It appears thelower court was swayed to decline the consideration of the c1aimsother than paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement ofclaim. As I earlier demonstrated the claims in reliefs 19(b) – ofthe said 2nd further amended statement of claim are not alternativesto the relief 19 granted.

I agree with Mr. Uwom, of counsel to the appellant, on theauthority of Okeowo v. Migliore (1979) ALL NLR 280; Awote v. Owodunni (No.2) (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 366; The State v. Ajie (2000) ALL FWLR (Pt. 16) 2831 at 2841, (2000) 11 NWLR(Pt.678) 438; Federal Ministry of Health v. Comet Shipping Agencies Ltd. (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 483) 1260 at 1282, (2009) 9NWLR (Pt.1145) 193, that the law is settled that a court has a duty,generally, to pronounce on all material issues raised before it. The duty becomes more imperative in relation to the intermediate courtthat the lower court is. On this, I have to recall the statement of this

court per Oguntade, JSC, in Paul Edem v. Canon Balls Ltd. & Ors(2005) 6 SC (Pt. II) 16; (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 27; that is –

“An intermediate court, as the court below, does nothave the liberty to decline a consideration of issues raised before it, unless it proposes to order a retrialand it felt that a consideration of the issues raised may prejudice a fresh hearing before the trial court. This is because a further appeal against the judgment of theCourt of Appeal may unsettle the decision of the courton the issues considered.

…………………….G…………………….

See also Xtoudos Services (Nig.) Ltd v. Taisei W. A. Ltd. (2006) WRN 46, (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1003) 533; Adegbuyi v. A.P.C. & Ors (2014) LPELR-24214 (SC), (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt.1442) 1.

From the Records of the lower court, when it affirmed the judgment of the trial court that granted only relief 19(a) in the judgment of the trial court that granted only relief 19 in the2nd further amended statement of claim and thereafter declined to consider the issues raised in the cross-appeal, did not propose to order a retrial. It therefore acted in error when it declined to consider the issues raised in the cross-appeal, particularly the issueof the consequential injunctive order sought by the appellant in paragraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of claim.

The consequential order was sought by the appellant by wayof alternative relief. A consequential order is the one which flowsdirectly and naturally from the decision or order of court made onthe issues in litigation. It is inevitably consequent upon it: Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 7 SCNJ (Pt.1) 199 at 155, (1992) 6NWLR (Pt.247) 266. The courts make consequential orders toprotect the judgment, particularly declaratory or the non-executory judgments, in favour of the plaintiff. As it appears from this court’s pronouncement in Okoye v. Chief Lands Officer, Rivers State (2005)4 SCNJ 158, reported as Briggs v. Chief Lands Officer, River State (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt.938) 59 every court has inherent powers to make consequential orders to give effect to its judgment. Even when the relief for consequential order was not specifically askedfor from the court, the court has the power to grant such relief asa consequential relief to give effect to its judgment or declaration which it follows, once from the facts it is incidentally necessary to protect established rights: Amaechi v. INEC (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 407) 1 at 96 & 119, (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227; Briggs v. Chief Lands Officer (supra) 170 & 189.

Mr. Uwom for the appellant submits, and I agree, that the injunctive relief claimed by the appellant, as the plaintiff, in this case is necessary to give the bite to and make more meaningful andenforceable the declaratory judgment the trial court granted in favour of the appellant. The refusal to grant the consequential order

…………………….H…………………….

soughtwould potentiate the respondents, against whom the declaratory relief was made, to flout the declaration made by the trial court withimpunity. It would tantamount to preventing the appellant from reaping the fruits or full benefits of the declaratory judgment he hadobtained from the court. On the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium courts do not make judgments that are in vain. It is beyond doubtthat an injunctive order is necessary to give bite to and to make enforceable the declaratory relief the trial court made in favour ofthe appellant: Egbe v. A.-G., Federation (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt.214) 169 at 174. Since a declaratory judgment merely proclaims ordeclares the existence of a legal right, it is not executory. It does not contain an order that may be enforced against the defendant or theparty against whom it is made. In the circumstances of this case an order bolstering the rights of the appellant proclaimed or declared against the respondents, as the defendants, was necessary. That wasthe purport of the alternative relief sought by the appellant as a consequential order. It is clear from the several previous decisionsof this court, particularly in Okoya v. Santilli & ors (1994) LPELR– 24851 (SC); (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 338) 256; Government of Gongola State v. Tukur (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592; Ogunlade v. Adeleye (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 260) 409 at 420, that the refusal of thetwo courts below to grant consequential order to give effect to the declaratory judgment, in terms of paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim, in favour of the appellant was an error redressible by this court. Accordingly, I resolve this issue in favourof the appellant and order that the respondent, their agents, privies and servants be and are hereby restrained from preventing theappellant his agent, privies and servants from the use of the Union land and other facilities and from interfering in any other mannerwith the appellant’s right as a member of the Union.

With the grant of the alternative relief as a consequential orderto bolster the relief granted under paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further

amended statement of claim I should think reliefs in paragraph 19& of the 2nd further amended statement of claim have(b) become spent.

…………………….I…………………….

The appellant submits that with the grant of the declaratoryrelief in paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement ofclaim by the two courts below, the two courts below should havegranted the relief for general damages, in the sum of N600,00.00,in his favour. The appellant, through his learned counsel, hassubmitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have held, andthe lower court affirmed, that he did not prove his entitlement tothe claim for general damages; whereas, through the evidence ofhis witnesses, he had proved the claim. The learned appellant’scounsel had submitted that through the witnesses the appellantproved that the respondents by preventing the appellant from doingbusiness on the union property and by denying him dividends fromthe union business during the period his expulsion lasted, hadsuffered loss. The appellant further made an issue of the stigmahe suffered from his expulsion on account of his expulsion beingrelated to his inability to account for union’s money. It is not indoubt that, as at the time of the proceedings at the trial court werepending, the appellant was being prosecuted for the alleged theftof Union’s funds, which according to the audit reports in exhibits Jand K, he could not account for. In fact the appellant was still beingprosecuted for the theft at the Magistrate’s Court on account of theauditors’ findings in exhibits J and K makes it unreasonable andpremature for any award of damages for the stigma the appellantallegedly suffered by that allegation. The trial court, at page 127 ofthe record, found –

“It is not in doubt that the plaintiff (appellant herein) isthe Treasurer of the Association, it is also not disputedthat the sum of 1119,353.10k belonging to the saidUnited Livestock Dealers Association Enterprises wasunaccounted for”

and it was “considered (in) exhibit K as cash misappropriated.”On this finding of fact, the trial court held that the appellant, as“the Treasurer of the Union charged with the duty of keeping theunion money is impliedly responsible for any loss of the Unionmoney as per exhibit K”. The appellant was being tried for theftof the money at the Magistrate’s Court at the time he was expelledwithout waiting for the outcome of the trial. That was the basis

of the trial court nullifying the expulsion. Exhibit K, however,remains extant, it has not been annulled. The suggestion that theappellant was stigmatised by exhibit K that the Union relied on,inter alia, for expelling him is rather spurious and unavailing tothe appellant. The fact remains that the appellant did not establishthat he accounted for the sum of N9,353.10k Union money in hispossession. He also did not rebut the strong allegation, backed byundiscredited evidence, that when the Union gave him money topay at the lands office to secure the Union’s interest in a parcelof land, he fraudulently caused the receipt to be issued in his ownname, instead of the Union.

…………………….J…………………….

In my considered opinion the appellant should not be rewardedfor perfidy and duplicity with an award of general damages for hisown unwholesome inequitable and unconscionable conduct thatprompted the reaction of the Union to this conduct unbecoming ofa treasurer of a Union. Equity follows the law. It will not allow thecourts to aid the nefarious and fraudulent conduct of a party. Sinceit will be unconscionable to award the general damages claimed inparagraph 19(e) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim, I amof the firm view that the claim shall be, and it is hereby refused.

The appeal is allowed in part. The two courts below were inerror in their refusal to consider an award of consequential injunctiveorder in support of the declaratory relief granted in favour. Thelower court, erroneously, did not even consider that complaintin the cross-appeal. The appellant is not entitled, equity actingin personam, to the general damages he claimed. His fraudulentconduct makes such award inequitable. He did not approach thesanctuary of justice with clean hands.

Parties shall bear their respective costs.

AKA’AHS, J.S.C.: I read before now the judgment of my learnedbrother, Eko, JSC.

The genesis of the dispute between the appellant and therespondents arose from the fact that the appellant was unable toaccount for the sum of N9,353.10 when he was the treasurer of theUnion and when he was given money to pay at the Land’s Office tosecure the Union’s interest over the land, he obtained the receipt inhis own name.

I share the sentiments expressed by Eko, JSC that even thoughthe appeal succeeds in part, the appellant is not entitled to thegeneral damages he claimed for the period he was expelled fromthe Union because of his fraudulent conduct in not accounting forthe N9,353.10 at the time he was the treasurer of the Union coupledwith the dishonesty he displayed in securing the receipt of paymentfor the land in his own name instead of the Union. The saying goesthat whoever goes to equity should do so with clean hands.

As the appeal partially succeeds no order on costs is made.

OKORO, J.S.C.: This is an appeal against the judgment of theCourt of Appeal, Port Harcourt Division in which the court belowaffirmed the judgment of the trial court but failed to consider thecross-appeal of this appellant which sought a consequential orderto bolster the declaratory order granted by the trial court.

…………………….K…………………….

I read in draft the lead judgment delivered by my brother,Ejembi Eko, JSC, and I am in agreement with his reasoningand conclusion that this appeal succeeds in part. My brother hasmeticulously dealt with the issues pontificated in this appeal andI adopt, with respect, what he has done as mine. I shall howevermake a few comments in support of the lead judgment.

It has become a general rule that a court has a duty to pronounceon all material issues raised before it. See Olowolagba & Ors v. Bakare & Ors (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 543) 528 at 534; State v. Ajie(2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 438 at 447. I hold the view that the courtbelow ought to have considered the cross-appeal of this appellantby pronouncing on the injunctive relief sought thereof. The law istrite that judgments of courts are not made in vain. Judgments mustbe enforced unless same is set aside by a superior court. Wherea declaratory relief has been granted, a consequential order flowsnecessarily to give efficacy to the declaratory order granted.

In the instant appeal, the injunctive relief sought by theappellant at the trial court was necessary as a consequential orderto give force to the declaratory relief in paragraph 19 of the2nd further amended statement of claim. A consequential orderdenotes an order following naturally in terms of consistency andgiving effect to the main judgment. It is usually granted to give

effect to the main relief or reliefs sought by a party. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423; Unity Bank Plc v. Denclag Limited (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 293. In the case ofAwoniyi v. Registered Trustees of the Rosicrucian order, AMORC (Nigeria) (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522 545 this court per Iguh,JSC observed as follows:

“The purpose of a consequential order is to giveeffect to the decision or judgment of the court butnot by granting an entirely new, unclaimed and/orincongruous relief which was not contested by theparties at the trial and neither did it fall in alignmentwith the original reliefs claimed in the suit nor was it inthe contemplation of the parties that such relief wouldbe the subject-matter of a formal executory judgmentor order against either side to the dispute”.

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It follows therefore that a consequential order flows necessarilyfrom the grant of the principal claim by the court.

See Hon. Chigozie Eze & Ors. v. Governor of Abia State & ors(2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 196; Dr. Chigbo Sam Eligwe v. Okpokiri (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1443) 348.

I hold the view that the court below was in error when itfailed to consider the cross-appeal of the appellant. The injunctiverelief sought in the said cross-appeal was expedient to bolster thedeclaratory order already granted. I so hold. In the circumstance,this appeal succeeds in part. The alternative relief seeking injunctiveorder restraining the respondents from preventing the appellantfrom the use of the Union land and from interfering in any mannerwith the appellant’s rights as a member of the union, is herebygranted. The claim for damages is however refused.

AUGIE, J.S.C.:I read in draft the lead judgment just delivered bymy learned brother, Eko, JSC, and I agree with him that this appealmust be allowed in part.

He dealt decisively with all the issues raised in this appeal,and I have nothing to add. I adopt his reasoning and conclusionregarding the appellant not deserving damages, and I allow theappeal in part.

ABBA AJI, JSC.:Having read the draft judgment of my learned brother, Ejembi Eko, JSC, I just have nothing to dissent on but to concur with all his reasonings, conclusions and orders.

His erudition, sagacity and appreciation of the facts and law cannot be unseated. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Thus, parties seeking the discretion of this court or any court for that matter must come with clean hands. See Per Ogebe, J.S.C. in Ifekandu & Anor v. Uzoegwu(2008) LPELR-1435(SC), (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1111) 508.

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The consequential or alternative reliefs sought by the appellant were rightly refused. The appeal is allowed in part.

Appeal allowed in part.

LOR (21/6/2019) SC

ALHAJI MOHAMMED KARAYE V. LEVI WIKE

IN SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

SC.312/2009

On Friday, 21st June 2019

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C. (Presided)

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C. (Read the Leading Judgment)

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.

ALHAJI MOHAMMED KARAYE

(Trading under the name and style of

United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)

V.

1. LEVI WIKE

2. SOLOMON OHABIKO

3. INNOCENT OSI

(Trading under the name and style of

United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)

…………………….A…………………….

EKO, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellantwas a founding member of United Livestock Dealers Enterprises,off Mile 3 Market, Diobu, Port Harcourt. In 1973 United LivestockDealers Enterprises (hereinafter called “the Union”) was given apiece of land at Mile 1, Biobu Market by the Port Harcourt CityCouncil. Between 1975 and 1983 the appellant, as the plaintiff,was the Vice-Chairman of the Union. It is averred in paragraph5 of the 2nd amended statement of claim that the ExecutiveCommittee of the Union, in which the appellant, as the plaintiff,was the Vice-Chairman did not maintain “proper account”. A newExecutive Committee was constituted in 1983, and the appellantwas appointed/elected “the treasurer of the union -” a post he helduntil the disagreement within the Union arose.

The respondents, as defendants, had pleaded in paragraph 11of the further amended statement of defence that the appellant, asthe treasurer, “could not account for the sum of N9,353.10 – whichwas in his possession.” They relied “on the audit report of the firmof Chartered Accountant, namely: Tamunoibi & Co. of AzikiweRoad, Port Harcourt to show that this amount was not accountedfor at the time of audit.” The respondents further alleged that “in1982 (the appellant) paid N200.00 given to him by the Union” topay at the Land’s Office to secure the Union’s interest over a pieceof land and that he, instead, “obtained the receipt in his own name.”In what appears their justification for terminating the appellants’membership of the union, the respondents averred inter-alia inparagraph 11 of the further amended statement of defence thatby “a letter dated 29th October, 1984, after the Union found (theappellant) was unable to account for huge sums of money that cameinto his possession for which he (was) being charged to court,” theydecided to terminate his membership of the Union. In other words,the appellant was expelled from the union during the pendency ofthe case at the Magistrate’s Court in which he was being prosecuted

for theft of the Union’s moneys in his possession that he could notaccount for. The auditors, in exhibits J and K, had found that theappellant could not account for N9,353.10.

The immediate cause of action on which the appellant initiatedthe suit at the trial court against the respondent was his expulsionfrom the Union for his inability to account for some Union moneys inhis possession. The expulsion of the appellant, during the pendencyof criminal charges for theft

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against him, was, as it appears, onaccount of the audit reports in exhibits J and K. At the trial HighCourt the appellant’s claims against the respondents were set outthus, in paragraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of claim–

19.The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants jointly andseverally are as follows:-

A declaration that both the plaintiff andthe defendants are members of the “UnitedLivestock Dealers Enterprises” off Mile 3market, Diobu, Port Harcourt, Rivers State,and the purported expulsion of the plaintifffrom the United Livestock Dealers Enterprisesby the defendants is unlawful, unconstitutional,contrary to the Rules of natural justice andfair hearing, null and void and of no effectand the plaintiff is still a member thereof andentitled to carryon his business and activitiesalong with the people trading under him atthe separate site for Livestock Dealers, offNkpolu Oroworukwo Road, Mile 3 Diobu,a. Port Harcourt.

A declaration that the piece or parcel of landlying and situate off Mile 3 Market, Diobu,Port Harcourt known and called “separate sitefor Livestock Dealers” belongs to both theplaintiff and their follower jointly and severallyb. and

That in view of the incessant threats to peaceand tranquility between both parties to thisaction, the plaintiff seek an order of thisc. honourable court partitioning the said piece

or parcel of land between the plaintiff and thedefendant.

That the said partition in paragraph above becarried out by the Nigerian Police and that thesaid land should be partitioned into two equalhalves for the benefit and use of the plaintiffd. and the defendants.

ALTERNATIVELY, an injunction restrainingthe defendants, their privies, servants andagents members of the United LivestockEnterprises.

N600,000.00 general damages for inferences,loss of union benefits, dealers unlawful loss offrom preventing the plaintiff and his followers/attachees/people trading under him from theuse of the union land known and called separatesite for Livestock Dealers and from interferingin any other manner with the plaintiff’sactivities (or the activities of his 11-followersattachees/people trading under him as business/customers and for inconveniences cause by thee. defendants against the plaintiff.

…………………….C…………………….

The trial High Court entered judgment in terms only ofparagraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim otherreliefs claimed by the appellant, that is: paragraph 19(b) – of the2nd further amended statement of claim were denied to the appellant.The granting of relief (19(a) prompted the respondent’s appeal tothe lower court. The appellant also cross-appealed the dismissal ofhis reliefs 19(b) – including the alternative injunctive relief. Thesubstantive appeal of the respondents was dismissed. The lowercourt, upon dismissing the substantive appeal, found no furtherneed to consider the cross-appeal. At page 220 of the record thelower court stated its position on the cross-appeal firmly thus-

Consideration of the cross-appeal will amount toan academic exercise which a court of law must notindulge on. With the decision of the (trial) courthaving been affirmed, the respondent (the appellantherein) remains a full fledged member of the Unionentitled to all the rights and privileges being a member

of the Union confers on him. The reliefs sought by thecross-appellant in his cross-appeal arose because ofhis expulsion by the cross respondents from the Union.With the decision of the (trial) court as affirmed hereinthat the expulsion was null and void, consideration ofthe cross-appeal becomes hypothetical and unavailingto the cross- appellant.

The stance of the lower court did not address the fear of theappellant, that is – should the respondents decide to flout the trialcourt’s declaration what sanction would avail him against therespondents?

This further appeal is premised on the foregoing decisionof the lower court. The two issues canvassed by the appellant inthis appeal are, in nutshell, predicated on the failure of the lowercourt to consider the issues raised before it in the cross-appeal,and the failure of the lower court to grant the reliefs sought bythe appellant. Let me pause awhile to take what appears to be apreliminary objection.

The respondents have raised a fundamental point whichmust, before any other thing, be resolved quickly. That is, that thecapacity the suit was instituted and determined by the trial court.The respondents, arguing this point,

…………………….D…………………….

contended that the appellantreverted, at page 132 of the record, to attaching “(Trading underthe name and style of United Livestock Dealers Enterprises)” to thename he filed the notice of appeal after the judgment. The noticeof appeal that initiated the cross-appeal at the lower court wasserved on the respondents. The respondents herein, as the cross-respondents raised no objection to the cross-appeal. Against whatappears to be belated preliminary objection to the appeal at thelower court, Mr. Uwom, of the counsel to the appellant, submitscorrectly, in my view, that the Supreme Court by dint of section233 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999,as amended, does not have jurisdiction to entertain the preliminaryobjection; in so far as the issue is tied to the competence of thesuit at the trial court or the appeal at the lower court. This issuerightly belongs to the lower court, and should have been raised atthe lower court. The respondents could only raise this issue upona notice of appeal by way of a ground of appeal upon leave soughtand granted to raise a fresh issue in this court. The issue, no doubt,

is incompetent having been raised without notice of appeal to thiscourt and upon a ground of appeal, for which leave should havebeen previously granted to the respondents, to raise as a freshissue: Ogundare v. Ogunlowo (1997) 5 SCNJ 281 at 286, (1997) 6NWLR (Pt.509) 360. The respondents did not raise this issue eitheras a preliminary objection to the appellant’s cross-appeal or as agrievance in their appeal at the lower court. This issue does notrelate to any ground of appeal in this court. It is just arising outof the blues from nowhere really. The issue being incompetent ishereby discountenanced.

Now to the complaint that appellant’s cross-appeal wasnot considered; a cross-appeal, by its nature, is a separate andindependent appeal. It is not an appendage to the main appeal, andits purpose is to enable the respondent in the main appeal to appealagainst the same judgment or part thereof that he (the respondent)is aggrieved with: Magna Maritime Services Ltd & Anor v. Oteju & Anor (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 55, (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945) 517;Akpan v. Bob & Ors (2010) 4 – 7 SC (Pt. ii) 57, (2010) 17 NWLR(Pt. 1223) 421; Lafia Local Govt. v. Executive Govenor, Nasarawa State & Ors (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 94.

The grouse of the appellant, as the cross-appellant at the lowercourt, is that the trial court annulled his expulsion from the Union

…………………….E…………………….

class=”justifier”>without considering his other reliefs in paragraph 19 of the 2nd

further amended statement of claim. He complains further that thelower court failed to consider/pronounce on the issue he had raisedin the cross-appeal. Mr. Uwom, learned counsel to the appellant,contends that at the lower court the appellant, in his cross-appeal,raised the issue of the trial court’s failure to grant the injunctiverelief, the alternative relief, as a consequential order to give bite,force or efficacy to the declaratory relief granted in favour of theappellant and that the grant of the consequential order was necessaryto prevent the respondents’ further infraction or interference withhis right as a member of the Union.

The respondents submit that the relief in paragraph 19(a) ofthe 2nd further amended statement of claim granted to the appellantwas the principal or substantive claim and that all other claimstherein were ancillary to that claim. It is further submitted forthe respondents that those other claims, being alternative to theclaim in paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement of

claim; the grant of the principal relief made it unnecessary, on theauthority of Onayemi v. Idowu (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 306 at336, for the two courts below to embark on further consideration ofthe alternative claims.

The respondents seem to get it wrong in their submissionthat the reliefs claimed in paragraph 19(b) – of the 2nd furtheramended statement of claim are ancillary to the relief in paragraph19(a) thereof and that those other reliefs are alternative reliefsto the relief in paragraph 19 (a). I, however, agree that the reliefimmediately after relief was no doubt expressly made as analternative relief to the reliefs seeking the partitioning of the Unionproperty. That alternative relief appears to be in relation only tothe reliefs in paragraph & of the 2nd further amendedstatement of claim. In other words, the injunctive relief was not,and could not have been, an alternative relief to the reliefs as perparagraph 19 & of the 2nd further amended statement ofclaim.

…………………….F…………………….

Having made this clarification; I agree, in principle, that wherea party to an action has proved his substantive claim there wouldbe no justification to embark on the consideration of his alternativeclaim, and that alternative claims are considered and granted wherethe grant of the substantive claim is either not feasible, unjust,or inequitable: Onayemi v. Idowu (supra); Ibafon Company Ltd. v. Nigerian Port Plc (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 667) 86.It appears thelower court was swayed to decline the consideration of the c1aimsother than paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement ofclaim. As I earlier demonstrated the claims in reliefs 19(b) – ofthe said 2nd further amended statement of claim are not alternativesto the relief 19 granted.

I agree with Mr. Uwom, of counsel to the appellant, on theauthority of Okeowo v. Migliore (1979) ALL NLR 280; Awote v. Owodunni (No.2) (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 366; The State v. Ajie (2000) ALL FWLR (Pt. 16) 2831 at 2841, (2000) 11 NWLR(Pt.678) 438; Federal Ministry of Health v. Comet Shipping Agencies Ltd. (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 483) 1260 at 1282, (2009) 9NWLR (Pt.1145) 193, that the law is settled that a court has a duty,generally, to pronounce on all material issues raised before it. Theduty becomes more imperative in relation to the intermediate courtthat the lower court is. On this, I have to recall the statement of this

court per Oguntade, JSC, in Paul Edem v. Canon Balls Ltd. & Ors(2005) 6 SC (Pt. II) 16; (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 27; that is –

“An intermediate court, as the court below, does nothave the liberty to decline a consideration of issuesraised before it, unless it proposes to order a retrialand it felt that a consideration of the issues raised mayprejudice a fresh hearing before the trial court. This isbecause a further appeal against the judgment of theCourt of Appeal may unsettle the decision of the courton the issues considered.

…………………….G…………………….

See also Xtoudos Services (Nig.) Ltd v. Taisei W. A. Ltd. (2006)WRN 46, (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1003) 533; Adegbuyi v. A.P.C. & Ors (2014) LPELR-24214 (SC), (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt.1442) 1.

From the Records of the lower court, when it affirmed thejudgment of the trial court that granted only relief 19(a) in thejudgment of the trial court that granted only relief 19 in the2nd further amended statement of claim and thereafter declinedto consider the issues raised in the cross-appeal, did not proposeto order a retrial. It therefore acted in error when it declined toconsider the issues raised in the cross-appeal, particularly the issueof the consequential injunctive order sought by the appellant inparagraph 19 of the 2nd further amended statement of claim.

The consequential order was sought by the appellant by wayof alternative relief. A consequential order is the one which flowsdirectly and naturally from the decision or order of court made onthe issues in litigation. It is inevitably consequent upon it: Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 7 SCNJ (Pt.1) 199 at 155, (1992) 6NWLR (Pt.247) 266. The courts make consequential orders toprotect the judgment, particularly declaratory or the non-executoryjudgments, in favour of the plaintiff. As it appears from this court’spronouncement in Okoye v. Chief Lands Officer, Rivers State (2005)4 SCNJ 158, reported as Briggs v. Chief Lands Officer, River State (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt.938) 59 every court has inherent powers tomake consequential orders to give effect to its judgment. Evenwhen the relief for consequential order was not specifically askedfor from the court, the court has the power to grant such relief asa consequential relief to give effect to its judgment or declarationwhich it follows, once from the facts it is incidentally necessary toprotect established rights: Amaechi v. INEC (2008) ALL FWLR

(Pt. 407) 1 at 96 & 119, (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227; Briggs v. Chief Lands Officer (supra) 170 & 189.

Mr. Uwom for the appellant submits, and I agree, that theinjunctive relief claimed by the appellant, as the plaintiff, in thiscase is necessary to give the bite to and make more meaningful andenforceable the declaratory judgment the trial court granted in favourof the appellant. The refusal to grant the consequential order

…………………….H…………………….

soughtwould potentiate the respondents, against whom the declaratoryrelief was made, to flout the declaration made by the trial court withimpunity. It would tantamount to preventing the appellant fromreaping the fruits or full benefits of the declaratory judgment he hadobtained from the court. On the principle of ubi jus ibi remediumcourts do not make judgments that are in vain. It is beyond doubtthat an injunctive order is necessary to give bite to and to makeenforceable the declaratory relief the trial court made in favour ofthe appellant: Egbe v. A.-G., Federation (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt.214) 169 at 174. Since a declaratory judgment merely proclaims ordeclares the existence of a legal right, it is not executory. It does notcontain an order that may be enforced against the defendant or theparty against whom it is made. In the circumstances of this case anorder bolstering the rights of the appellant proclaimed or declaredagainst the respondents, as the defendants, was necessary. That wasthe purport of the alternative relief sought by the appellant as aconsequential order. It is clear from the several previous decisionsof this court, particularly in Okoya v. Santilli & ors (1994) LPELR– 24851 (SC); (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 338) 256; Government of Gongola State v. Tukur (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592; Ogunlade v. Adeleye (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 260) 409 at 420, that the refusal of thetwo courts below to grant consequential order to give effect to thedeclaratory judgment, in terms of paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd furtheramended statement of claim, in favour of the appellant was an errorredressible by this court. Accordingly, I resolve this issue in favourof the appellant and order that the respondent, their agents, priviesand servants be and are hereby restrained from preventing theappellant his agent, privies and servants from the use of the Unionland and other facilities and from interfering in any other mannerwith the appellant’s right as a member of the Union.

With the grant of the alternative relief as a consequential orderto bolster the relief granted under paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further

amended statement of claim I should think reliefs in paragraph 19& of the 2nd further amended statement of claim have(b) become spent.

…………………….I…………………….

The appellant submits that with the grant of the declaratoryrelief in paragraph 19(a) of the 2nd further amended statement ofclaim by the two courts below, the two courts below should havegranted the relief for general damages, in the sum of N600,00.00,in his favour. The appellant, through his learned counsel, hassubmitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have held, andthe lower court affirmed, that he did not prove his entitlement tothe claim for general damages; whereas, through the evidence ofhis witnesses, he had proved the claim. The learned appellant’scounsel had submitted that through the witnesses the appellantproved that the respondents by preventing the appellant from doingbusiness on the union property and by denying him dividends fromthe union business during the period his expulsion lasted, hadsuffered loss. The appellant further made an issue of the stigmahe suffered from his expulsion on account of his expulsion beingrelated to his inability to account for union’s money. It is not indoubt that, as at the time of the proceedings at the trial court werepending, the appellant was being prosecuted for the alleged theftof Union’s funds, which according to the audit reports in exhibits Jand K, he could not account for. In fact the appellant was still beingprosecuted for the theft at the Magistrate’s Court on account of theauditors’ findings in exhibits J and K makes it unreasonable andpremature for any award of damages for the stigma the appellantallegedly suffered by that allegation. The trial court, at page 127 ofthe record, found –

“It is not in doubt that the plaintiff (appellant herein) isthe Treasurer of the Association, it is also not disputedthat the sum of 1119,353.10k belonging to the saidUnited Livestock Dealers Association Enterprises wasunaccounted for”

and it was “considered (in) exhibit K as cash misappropriated.”On this finding of fact, the trial court held that the appellant, as“the Treasurer of the Union charged with the duty of keeping theunion money is impliedly responsible for any loss of the Unionmoney as per exhibit K”. The appellant was being tried for theftof the money at the Magistrate’s Court at the time he was expelledwithout waiting for the outcome of the trial. That was the basis

of the trial court nullifying the expulsion. Exhibit K, however,remains extant, it has not been annulled. The suggestion that theappellant was stigmatised by exhibit K that the Union relied on,inter alia, for expelling him is rather spurious and unavailing tothe appellant. The fact remains that the appellant did not establishthat he accounted for the sum of N9,353.10k Union money in hispossession. He also did not rebut the strong allegation, backed byundiscredited evidence, that when the Union gave him money topay at the lands office to secure the Union’s interest in a parcelof land, he fraudulently caused the receipt to be issued in his ownname, instead of the Union.

…………………….J…………………….

In my considered opinion the appellant should not be rewardedfor perfidy and duplicity with an award of general damages for hisown unwholesome inequitable and unconscionable conduct thatprompted the reaction of the Union to this conduct unbecoming ofa treasurer of a Union. Equity follows the law. It will not allow thecourts to aid the nefarious and fraudulent conduct of a party. Sinceit will be unconscionable to award the general damages claimed inparagraph 19(e) of the 2nd further amended statement of claim, I amof the firm view that the claim shall be, and it is hereby refused.

The appeal is allowed in part. The two courts below were inerror in their refusal to consider an award of consequential injunctiveorder in support of the declaratory relief granted in favour. Thelower court, erroneously, did not even consider that complaintin the cross-appeal. The appellant is not entitled, equity actingin personam, to the general damages he claimed. His fraudulentconduct makes such award inequitable. He did not approach thesanctuary of justice with clean hands.

Parties shall bear their respective costs.

AKA’AHS, J.S.C.: I read before now the judgment of my learnedbrother, Eko, JSC.

The genesis of the dispute between the appellant and therespondents arose from the fact that the appellant was unable toaccount for the sum of N9,353.10 when he was the treasurer of theUnion and when he was given money to pay at the Land’s Office tosecure the Union’s interest over the land, he obtained the receipt inhis own name.

I share the sentiments expressed by Eko, JSC that even thoughthe appeal succeeds in part, the appellant is not entitled to thegeneral damages he claimed for the period he was expelled fromthe Union because of his fraudulent conduct in not accounting forthe N9,353.10 at the time he was the treasurer of the Union coupledwith the dishonesty he displayed in securing the receipt of paymentfor the land in his own name instead of the Union. The saying goesthat whoever goes to equity should do so with clean hands.

As the appeal partially succeeds no order on costs is made.

OKORO, J.S.C.: This is an appeal against the judgment of theCourt of Appeal, Port Harcourt Division in which the court belowaffirmed the judgment of the trial court but failed to consider thecross-appeal of this appellant which sought a consequential orderto bolster the declaratory order granted by the trial court.

…………………….K…………………….

I read in draft the lead judgment delivered by my brother,Ejembi Eko, JSC, and I am in agreement with his reasoningand conclusion that this appeal succeeds in part. My brother hasmeticulously dealt with the issues pontificated in this appeal andI adopt, with respect, what he has done as mine. I shall howevermake a few comments in support of the lead judgment.

It has become a general rule that a court has a duty to pronounceon all material issues raised before it. See Olowolagba & Ors v. Bakare & Ors (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 543) 528 at 534; State v. Ajie(2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 438 at 447. I hold the view that the courtbelow ought to have considered the cross-appeal of this appellantby pronouncing on the injunctive relief sought thereof. The law istrite that judgments of courts are not made in vain. Judgments mustbe enforced unless same is set aside by a superior court. Wherea declaratory relief has been granted, a consequential order flowsnecessarily to give efficacy to the declaratory order granted.

In the instant appeal, the injunctive relief sought by theappellant at the trial court was necessary as a consequential orderto give force to the declaratory relief in paragraph 19 of the2nd further amended statement of claim. A consequential orderdenotes an order following naturally in terms of consistency andgiving effect to the main judgment. It is usually granted to give

effect to the main relief or reliefs sought by a party. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423; Unity Bank Plc v. Denclag Limited (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 293. In the case ofAwoniyi v. Registered Trustees of the Rosicrucian order, AMORC (Nigeria) (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 676) 522 545 this court per Iguh,JSC observed as follows:

“The purpose of a consequential order is to giveeffect to the decision or judgment of the court butnot by granting an entirely new, unclaimed and/orincongruous relief which was not contested by theparties at the trial and neither did it fall in alignmentwith the original reliefs claimed in the suit nor was it inthe contemplation of the parties that such relief wouldbe the subject-matter of a formal executory judgmentor order against either side to the dispute”.

…………………….L…………………….

It follows therefore that a consequential order flows necessarilyfrom the grant of the principal claim by the court.

See Hon. Chigozie Eze & Ors. v. Governor of Abia State & ors(2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 196; Dr. Chigbo Sam Eligwe v. Okpokiri (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1443) 348.

I hold the view that the court below was in error when itfailed to consider the cross-appeal of the appellant. The injunctiverelief sought in the said cross-appeal was expedient to bolster thedeclaratory order already granted. I so hold. In the circumstance,this appeal succeeds in part. The alternative relief seeking injunctiveorder restraining the respondents from preventing the appellantfrom the use of the Union land and from interfering in any mannerwith the appellant’s rights as a member of the union, is herebygranted. The claim for damages is however refused.

AUGIE, J.S.C.:I read in draft the lead judgment just delivered bymy learned brother, Eko, JSC, and I agree with him that this appealmust be allowed in part.

He dealt decisively with all the issues raised in this appeal,and I have nothing to add. I adopt his reasoning and conclusionregarding the appellant not deserving damages, and I allow theappeal in part.

ABBA AJI, JSC.:Having read the draft judgment of my learned brother, Ejembi Eko, JSC, I just have nothing to dissent on but to concur with all his reasonings, conclusions and orders.

His erudition, sagacity and appreciation of the facts and law cannot be unseated. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. Thus, parties seeking the discretion of this court or any court for that matter must come with clean hands. See Per Ogebe, J.S.C. in Ifekandu & Anor v. Uzoegwu(2008) LPELR-1435(SC), (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt.1111) 508.

…………………….M…………………….

The consequential or alternative reliefs sought by the appellant were rightly refused. The appeal is allowed in part.

Appeal allowed in part.

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