In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 13th day of February, 2018


Before Their Lordships

MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM  Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI  Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
NONYEREM OKORONKWO  Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria






NONYEREM OKORONKWO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The respondents in this appeal are husband and wife and engaged in the business of cement retail distribution. The appellants are also husband and wife with the wife of 2nd respondent engaged in retailing the bulk cement orders procured by the 2nd respondent at a market in Sagamu Ogun State.
Curiously both parties claim to be clergymen with their wives claiming to have some respectable positions or titles.
The facts as given by the respondents as garnered from their pleadings and in the judgment were that 2nd respondent Lady Evangelist Afolashade Abiodun was over seeing the cement business of the respondents by obtaining cement orders from the respondents for selling same on respondents behalf. In the course of the business, 1st appellant aforesaid obtained from the respondents Cement Order for 405 tons of Elephant Cement from the West African Portland Cement factor equaling 8,100 bags of cement.
The bags of cement were sold by the 2nd appellant but the appellants converted the proceeds of sales which at the time was N12,960,000.00 given the price of cement at N1, 600.00 per bag at the time. This was the basis of the respondents claim for N12, 960, 000 against the appellants.
The 2nd appellant in apparent satisfaction of the debt issued in her hand a written undertaken by way of a promissory agreement dated 5th April 2007 whereby she acknowledged the debt and undertook to pay or return the cement on or before December 2007. The written undertaken was tendered in evidence as Exhibit C3. 2nd appellant went on to give a formal memorandum dated 25th May 2007 acknowledging the misappropriation of the cement consignment and a draft of formal agreement to the same effect prepared by the solicitor of the appellants. These memoranda of acknowledgment were tendered as C3, C4 and C8
To support the undertakings and acknowledgments, the 1st appellant being husband of 2nd appellant delivered the original copy of his Land Purchase receipt dated 25/2/2005 in respect of land on which the 1st appellants building No. 28 Efunsoju Street Aiyegbami, Ofin Sagamu to the respondents admitted as Exhibit 16. In addition, appellants delivered to the respondents original copies of their share certificates in Public quoted Banks admitted as Exhibit C10-C15 all as in part payment of appellants indebtedness to the respondents.
For the appellants, who were the 1st and 2nd defendants at the lower Court, I would reproduce their case as recorded by the trial judge at page 224 – 225 of the record thus:
The case of the defendants, on the other hand, as stated by DW2 and DW3 is that the 1st defendant had never been involved in the cement business of the 2nd defendant. That contrary to the claims of the claimants, the handwritten promissory note written and signed by the defendants was only a re-writing of the one written by the 1st claimant and which the defendants were forced to write and sign under gun-point by the 1st claimant on the 5th April, 2007 when the claimants visited the house of the defendants to demand for the missing cement. The 1st claimant insisted that unless the 2nd defendant paid to the missing cement, he would kill the defendants, their children and the 2nd defendant’s mother. It was in order to avert the consequences of the threats of murder by the 1st claimant, that the defendants signed the promissory note and the 1st defendant was compelled by the 1st claimant to re-write the letter of undertaking in his (1st defendant’s) hand-writing and same was also signed by all the parties. Contrary to the claims of the claimants, it was the 1st claimant who directed the defendants to take the letter of undertaking to their lawyer for him to use same to prepare a formal promissory agreement. On the 11th of April, 2007, when the promissory agreement was to be executed, the 1st claimant refused to sign same, but rather produced another one prepared by his own lawyer which he insisted the defendants must sign, and which document was to the effect that the 1st defendant had sold his personal house at No. 28 Efunsoju Street, Aiyegbami, Sagamu as part payment for the indebtedness of the 2nd defendant to the 1st claimant. Following their refusal to sign the document, the defendants lawyer, Otunba Onafadeji (who testified as DW3) left the place in annoyance. It was after his departure that the 1st claimant’s sister, Mrs. Adefulu, in whose house they had converged, bolted the door


whilst the 1st claimant brought out his gun threatening to kill the defendants unless they signed the documents of sale of the 1st defendant???s house to the 1st claimant. Following a telephone call to their lawyer (DW3), he advised them to sign the Deed of assignment to save their lives. On the 25th of May, 2007, the 1st claimant came to Sagamu with another prepared promissory agreement which he wanted the defendants to sign. The 1st defendant was assaulted by the 1st claimant who tore his clothes while the 2nd defendant was also assaulted by Mrs. Julie Adefulu, the 1st claimant’s sister. It was due to the assault on them that the defendants again signed the promissory agreement. The defendants are contending that Exhibit C16 was forcefully taken from the 1st defendant by the 1st claimant and that the 2nd defendant never gave the original copies of her share certificates to the 1st claimant as same were also forcefully taken from her under the threat of death by the 1st claimant. According to them, the 1st defendant was never a party directly or indirectly to the business relationship that existed between the 1st claimant and 2nd defendant.
This was the case before the trial Court. The argument of the appellants was that the 1st appellant was not involved in the cement business and that it was only the 2nd appellant that had a business relationship with the respondent. It was also the appellants case that they were forced to sign the documents relied on by the respondent by duress, intimidation and at gun point.
On the pleadings and evidence, the trial judge found that the appellants did not challenge the appropriation of the cement order by the 2nd appellant from the 2nd respondent holding that the pleadings and evidence remains unchallenged citing Olohunde vs. Adeyoju (2000) 10 NWLR (pt. 676) 33 and Odunsi vs. Bamgbala (1995) 1 NWLR (pt. 374) p. 29. The trial judge also made reference to the various meetings between the parties at various locations and held that it was to resolve the indebtedness that those meetings were held.
On the use of force, intimidation or gun threat to coerce the appellant to sign the Exhibit C document of undertaking, indemnity the trial judge at page 233 of the records held thus:
I find and I so hold that the defendants have failed to establish by any credible evidence that Exhibit C3, C4, C5 and C8 were executed under any threat, intimidation or duress. Afortiori, the 1st defendant, out of his free will pledged his property at no. 28, Efunsoju Street, Aiyegbami, Sagamu as security for the 2nd defendant???s indebtedness to the 1st claimant.
Lon-chiding, the lower Court made the following orders in favour of the respondents.
1. An order of this Court is hereby granted for the payment of the sum of twelve million, nine hundred and sixty thousand naira (N12,960,000) being the value of the 405 tons of cement converted by the 2nd defendant and for which the 1st defendant guaranteed repayment.
2. It is hereby ordered that the story building situate at no. 28, Efunsoju Street, Aiyegbami, Ofin, Sagamu be sold and the proceeds be used to offset the said sum of twelve million, nine hundred and sixty thousand naira (N12,960.000) referred to in order (1) above.
3. It is further ordered that the shares stated in the share certificates (Exhibits C10-C15) be 
sold and the proceeds be used to offset the said sum of twelve million, nine hundred and sixty thousand naira (N12,960,000) referred to in order (1) above.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court given on 31-3-2011, the appellants by Notice of Appeal filed 11 4 2011 commenced this appeal which Notice of Appeal was later amended vide Amended Notice of Appeal filed 5/12/16.
From the grounds of appeal raised, the appellants formulated the 6 issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the learned trial judge was correct in relying on Exhibits 3, C4 and C8 as the documents in which the 1st appellant pledged his Property as security for the 2nd appellant’s indebtedness, and not as documents merely pleaded and tendered as acknowledgment of the 2nd appellant’s indebtedness. And whether Exhibits C3, C4 and C8 are admissible in evidence to prove that 1st appellant had pledged his Property. This is distilled from ground 5 of the amended grounds of appeal.
2. Whether the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the


1st appellant who was not a party to Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, which are agreement between the 2nd appellant and the respondents could be bound by the term of the said documents and whether the 1st appellant would still be a necessary party to this case having been found not to be a party to the business transaction between the 2nd appellant and the respondent. This issue is distilled from grounds 1 and 3 of the amended grounds of appeal.
3. Whether the learned trial judge was correct when he held that the appellants failed to establish with any credible evidence that Exhibit C3, C4, C5 and C8 were executed under any threat, intimidation or duress. This issue is distilled from ground 6 of the amended grounds of appeal.
4. Whether Exhibit C5 is a valid document that can pass a good title to the respondent under the law. This issue is distilled from ground 2 of the Amended grounds of appeal.
5. Whether from the totality of the evidence and the material facts placed before the trial Court by the 2nd appellant, the learned trial judge was correct 
in holding that the 2nd appellant was indebted to the 1st respondent for the sum of Twelve million, nine hundred and sixty thousand naira (N12,960,000.00). This issue is distilled from ground 4 of the amended grounds of appeal.
6. Whether the learned trial judge properly and adequately evaluate the evidence adduced. This issue is distilled from ground 7 of the amended grounds of appeal.

By reason of the tardiness of counsel as disclosed at the hearing of this appeal, the respondent filed no respondents brief and so the appeal was heard on the appellant’s brief alone.
In arguing the issues, particularly issues 1 and 2, the appellant contend that Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, were documents in acknowledgment of appellants indebtedness and cannot be used for the purpose of establishing indemnity or guarantee binding on the 1st appellant citing Ream Ltd vs. Aswani Textile Industries(1991) 2 NWLR (pt. 176) 639; Odinkemere vs. Impresit Bakolori Nig. Ltd. (1995) 8 NWLR (pt. 411) 52 at 67.
At paragraph 4.07  4.09 of appellants brief it was argued thus by appellant’s counsel. Assuming but without conceding that those documents i.e. Exhibit C3, C4 and C8,were tendered as documents in which the 1st appellant pledged his property at No. 28, Efunsoju Street, Aiyegbami, Sagamu as security for the 2nd appellant’s indebtedness to the 1st claimant as it held by the learned trial judge.
We submit that those documents are not admissible in evidence by virtue of provisions of Section 16 of the Land Instruments Registration Law of Ogun State which forbids any instrument affecting any land being pleaded or tendered in evidence unless it is registered. See OGBIMI VS. NIGER CONST. LTD (2006) 9 NWLR (pt. 986) at 493 494.
We urge this Honourable Court to reverse the decision of the trial Court on this point because he placed reliance on inadmissible evidence in arriving same. See AMAYO VS. OYEWOLE (2009) 8 NWLR (PT. 1142) 1 at 13 where it was held inter alia that:
It is settled law that an Appellate Court will reverse the decision of a trial Court if it is of the opinion that inadmissible evidence influenced the decision of the trial Court, which would not have been the same if 
it was not admitted,
We respectfully urge this Honourable Court to resolve this issue in the favour of the appellant AND hold that the learned trial Court was wrong to have relied on Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, as document upon which the 1st appellant allegedly pledged his property.

On the related issue No. 2, the appellants argument is that the 1st appellant as found by the trial judge was not a party to the cement contract or business of the 2nd appellant and the respondent and so it was not legal to hold 1st appellant liable or answerable for any liability arising under the contract or business. Citing Idufueko vs. Pfizer Products and Anor. (2014) 7 SCM 41 to the effect that only the parties to a contract can sue or be sued on the contract; a stranger to contract can neither be sued nor be sued on the contract”. See Chukwuma Makwe vs. Nwukor & Anor (2001) 14 NWLR (pt. 733) 356. 
Appellants counsel further on this submission argued in par. 5.03  5.06 and submit that only parties to the contract and Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, can be bound


It is our contention that the said exhibits are strictly between the parties therein.
We submit that the 1st appellant is a stranger to the said documents in all respect. Not even the alleged pledging of his building in the said documents can make him a party. See UBA PLC. VS. OGUNDOKUN (2009) 6 NWLR (pt. 1138) 450 at 482; B.I.G.C. VS. BASSEY (2009)9 NWLR (pt. 1147) 473 at 481; C.B. LTD. VS. INTERCITY BANK PLC.(2009) 15 NWLR (pt. 1165) 445 at 464; B.M. LTD. VS. WOERMANN-LINE (2009) 13 NWLR (pt. 1157) 149 at 180.
In B.M. LTD. VS. WOERMANN-LINE (Supra), the Supreme Court held thus:
In short, only parties to a contract can sue and be sued on the contract and a stranger to a contract can neither sue or be sued on the contract even if the contract is made for his benefit and purport to give him the right to sue or make him liable upon it. Moreover, the fact that a person who is a stranger to the consideration of a contract stands in such near relationship to the party from whom the consideration proceeds that he may be considered a party to the consideration does not entitle him to sue or be sued upon the 
ontract(Underlined supplied for emphasis).
See also the case of REBOLD IND. LTD. VS. MAGREOLA & ORS. (2015) 3 SCM 37 at 249 where it was held as follows:
I must state clearly that there is in the law of contract what is referred to as privity of contract. It is always between the contacting parties who must stand or fall, benefit or lose from the provisions of the contract. That is to say, there contract cannot bind third parties nor can third parties take or accept liabilities under it, nor benefit thereunder
In order to appreciate the contention of the appellants, we commend the contents of Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, to your Lordships appraisal.
In Exhibit C3, the language of the document is that of first person singular i.e.
I Afolashade Abiodun owing you Mr. & Mrs. Ajisafe
We submit that the only person the document binds is Afolashade Abiodun.
Similarly, the content of Exhibit C4 has expressly mentioned the parties therein to be Mrs. Afolashade Abiodun (debtor) and Pastor and Deaconess 
Adedayo Jeremiah & Olusola Abiodun Ajisafe (creditors).
It is therefore correct to state that those documents bind the parties mentioned therein only.

On the question of duress intimidation, violence that appellants alleged made 1st appellant sign the Exhibit C memoranda, appellants counsel argues that the trial judge was wrong in holding that the evidence adduced was hearsay citing Subramanian vs. DPP (1956) 1 WLR 965.

Issue 4 relates to Exhibit C5 and the holding of the trial court that y Exhibit C5 (a deed of assignment under the signature of the 1st defendant as assignor, the said property was transferred to the 1st claimant.
Counsel for appellants made submissions on the inadmissibility of Exhibit C5 and C17 to prove pledge of property of 1st appellant as security to 2nd appellant indebtedness citing the Land Instrument Preparation Law of Ogun State Vol. 3 2001; Ukeje vs. Ukeje (2014) 7 SCM 148 at 168.
Resolution of Issues
Nearly all the issues of facts have been resolved by the trial judge in my opinion. What is really at large  the legal nature of the transaction between the parties? What head of law encapsulates the facts as found by the trial judge?
As the trial Court found, there was a cement transaction between the respondents and the 2nd appellant. It would appear to be in the nature of a commercial bailment.
To elucidate the nature of the transaction which I consider to be a bailment for valuable consideration hence the tag Commercial I will with the utmost respect adopt the definition given by Pollock and Wright in “Possession in the Common Law” adopted in Chitty on contract (Specific Contract) at paragraph 2201 to the effect that:
Definition of bailment: A classic definition of bailment is that of Pollock and Wright. Any person is to be considered as a bailee who otherwise than as a servant either receives possession of a thing from another or consents to receive or hold possession of a thing for another upon an undertaking with the other person either to keep and return or to deliver to him the specific thing or to (covey and) apply the specific thing according to the directions antecedent or future of the other


person. The important feature of bailment is the transfer of possession of the thing to the bailee (or the acquisition of possession by him) so that the bailee is entitled to possessory remedies (such as trespass, detinue or conversion) against all strangers, and even in many cases, against the bailor himself? A bailment is more than a contract in that possession, a proprietary interest less than ownership, is transferred to, or acquired by, the bailee, and many remedies in tort and crime become available to the bailee because he enjoys possession.
The 2nd appellant is therefore a bailee of the respondents entrusted for value with 405 tons of cement of the respondent. From the evidence, it is indisputable that 2nd appellant converted the cement or its proceed to her use or the use of another. What then is her (2nd appellant) liability at law? Again, Chitty on Contract at paragraph 2206 has this to proclaim in cases of conversion by the bailee.
Conversion of the chattel by the bailee: The bailee is under a duty to his bailor not to convert the chattel, i.e. not to do intentionally in relation to the chattel an act inconsistent with the bailor’s right of property in it; thus a sale, pledge, or offering for sale, of the chattel terminates the bailment forthwith, and the immediate right to the possession of the chattel revests in the bailor. Such acts, as well as being conversions, will normally be fundamental breaches of contract outside the scope of any exemption clause.
The above represents the law in Nigeria. In Panalpina World Transport (Nig.) Ltd. Vs. M.T. Wariboko (1975) 2 S.C. 27. The Supreme Court reiterated the Common Law position thus:
Whenever goods belonging to one person are conditionally entrusted to the care of another person for safekeeping or for other purposes, whether gratuitously or for reward on the clear understanding that the goods in question shall ultimately be returned or delivered to the owner, failure to deliver or return the said goods as agreed upon raises a presumption of negligence (on conversion) against the bailee.”
The nature of most bailments is that it may partake of attributes of contract or tort on agency or may be entirely sui generis but its essential feature is the possession of the bailee and the consequence thereof. See Broad-line Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Monterey Maritime Corporation (1995) 10 SCNJ 1. See also Federal Ministry of Health & Anor. Vs. Comet Shipping Agencies (2009) 4-5 S.C. (pt. 11) 110.
In this case, the 2nd appellant on her own admitted liability vide Exhibit C3 C4 and C8 and her husband 1st appellant pledged his property as security for 2nd appellant’s indebtedness (See paragraph 3.01 of appellants brief). Under what canopy of law does this come under? Appellants counsel skillfully argue that the 1st appellant is a stranger to the contract of bailment and so can neither be bound by the contract nor its incidences but the trial judge thought otherwise and without explaining the rationale for it held that the husband 1st appellant is jointly liable having pledged his property as security for the default of 2nd appellant.
From the facts as found by the trial judge and the intention of the parties as revealed in the Exhibit C series particularly Exhibit C3, C4 and C8, it appears to me to be a clear case of surety-ship. Again, I will rely on Chitty for elucidation. Surety-ship is explained at paragraph 4801 thereof as:
General nature of the contract: A contract of surety-ship is in essence a contract by which one person (the surety) agrees to answer for some liability of another (the principal debtor) to a third person (the creditor). The contract may be constituted by a personal engagement on the part of the surety, or by a charge on property without any personal liability, or by both. Prima facie a surety does not merely undertake to perform if the principal debtor fails to do so; he undertakes to see that the principal debtor will perform. Important results flow from this prima facie rule of construction. In particular it means that a surety is normally liable to the same extent as the principal debtor for damages for breach of the latter’s obligations even though he has not in terms guaranteed the payment of damages.
Learned counsel for appellants has made heavy weather of the 1st appellant not being a party in the contract and so having nothing to do with it but in Duncan Fox & Co vs. North and South Wales Bank (1880) 6 APP


Cas. 1, 11  12 it was pointed out that there are three possible variations in the parties to a contract of surety-ship. The first and simplest case is that in which all three parties concerned are parties to the contract in the sense that the Principal debtor and the creditor agree that the surety’s liability is secondary liability only and that the principal debtor is primarily liable for the obligations guaranteed. But it is also possible that the contract of surety-ship may be recognized only as between the principal debtor and the surety or as between creditor and surety, in which even the rights and duties arising out of the contract of surety-ship only affect those parties. (See Paragraph 4802 of Chitty on Contract)
In Nigeria, the position is not different as espoused under the Common Law. InKhaled Barakat Chami vs. United Bank Plc. (2010) 2-3 SC (Pt.11) 92 the nature of Surety-ship was explained as:
Where a Person personally guarantees the liability of a third Party by entering into a contract of guarantee or surety-ship, a distinct and separate contract from the principal debtors is thereby created between the guarantor and the creditor. The contract of guarantee created can be enforced against the guarantor directly or independently without the necessity of joining the principal debtor in the proceedings to enforce same. The right of a creditor is not conditional as he is entitled to proceed against the guarantor without or independently of the incident of default of the principal debtor. See Khaled Barakat Chami vs. U. B. A. Supra.
One may ask, what about consideration like the appellants counsel wondered in his submissions thoughtfully. In this case, the respondents had a right to sue the 2nd appellant for the goods converted or may even bring criminal prosecution for offences like criminal breach of trust or conversion but by reason of the intervention of the 2nd appellants husband i.e. 1st appellant, the respondents forbore to sue or bring prosecution against the 1st appellant. That was consideration that the law recognizes. In John Youngs vs. Racheed Chidiak & Ors (1970) NSCC 138. It was held that a forbearance to sue or to take the principal debtor to Court given of the request of the guarantor is sufficient consideration for the guarantee. So in this case, contrary to appellants counsel submission, the consideration is the forbearance of the respondents in taking further steps.
Another issue that nagged the appellant’s lawyer is whether there was a valid transfer by the 1st appellant’s property No.28 Efunsoju Street, Aiyegbami Sagamu in the absence of a valid deed of transfer complying with the Lands Instruments preparation Law of Ogun State.
It must be stated that the respondent case is not founded of transfer of property but on the promise the substratum of the surety-ship agreements. This is why relief No.2 of their claim sought for an Order Vesting the title of the property in the respondent. If there was an immediately effective transfer, such a claim would be unnecessary.
The Court in making such an order would be acting under its Equity Jurisdiction and would be looking at the intent rather than to the form which was explained in Parkin vs. Thoroid (1852) 16 Bear 59 at 66 wherein Romily M. R. decreed that Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases that which is a matter of substance and that which is a matter of form; and if it finds that by on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form and thereby defeat the substance. The Maxims in Equity are Equity look to the intent rather than the Form and Equity imputes an intention to fulfill an obligation which in Snell’s Principles of Equity is explained thus:
When a man is under an obligation to do an act and he does some other act which is capable of being regarded a fulfillment of his obligation, the later act will Prima facie be so regarded; for it right to put the most favourable construction on a man’s act and to presume that he intends to be just before he effects to be generous.” See Sowden vs. Sowden (1785) 1 Bro. CC 582. There are ample illustrations by the Supreme Court on these Maxims. They are T. L. Owosho & Ors. M. A. Dada (1984) NSCC 568 to the effect that where a person has given his word to another upon which that other has taken some material or substantial steps equity will insist that the man should keep his word.
Equity regards as done that which ought to have been done Dr. N. A Iragumina vs. Rivers State


Property Dev. Authority (2003) 7 SCM 93.
To conclude on this point, the action was founded on the promise not on any deed. The memoranda adduced in evidence were proof of the promise and intention and a Court of equity can act on than by imputing the requisite intention thereby to fulfill the promise. In this case, the Order for Sale of the property was to be effected by the Court itself and not the respondents. In the same vein, the argument on admissibility of those memoranda is academic.
Against the foregoing arguments and resolution of facts and the principles of Law espoused, I resolve all the six issues raised in this appeal against the appellant.
In the final analysis, appeal lacks merit and it hereby dismissed with cost assessed at N300, 000.00
MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.: The facts of the case which led to this appeal have been held to be well established and only the application of the law is in contention.
My learned brother Nonyerem Okoronkwo JCA has considered the relevant law in this appeal and has placed the legal issues at the door step of the Estoppel of Bailment.
The 2nd Appellant is a bailee in a sale of cement consignments for the Respondents.
Ordinarily, once a relationship is established where there is a parting with possession of one’s Chattel (goods) and the receipt by another in trust for refund/payment, a bailment relationship is created.
In the case Adetoun Oladeji (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Nigerian Breweries Plc. (2007) 1-2 SC Pt. 11 P. 183 Onnoghen JSC (AHTW) explained that bailment arises by way of contract where in the delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) to another (bailee) who holds the property for a certain purpose under an express or implied term of contract. (See also Holts Transport Ltd. v. IL Chellarams & Son (Nigeria) Ltd 1973 SC, Odinake v. Moghadu(1992) NWLR Pt. 233 P. 12).
I should further state that the 2nd Appellant having made an undertaking to pay or return the cement failed to keep to her word. The failure amounts to a breach of bailment requiring a remedy .
In the case of WAEC v. Koroye(1977) 2 SC P. 24; WAEC v. Koroye (1977) LPELR 3476 SC, the Apex Court held that:
” ….the law relating to the liability of a bailee for breach of a bailment is founded on the principle of restitutio in intergrum. The 1st Respondent was rightly held entitled to be compensated.”
I agree with the lead Judgment that this appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.
I adopt the order as to cost made in the lead Judgment.
HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, J.C.A.: I read in advance the judgment delivered by learned brother, Nonyerem Okoronkwo, JCA.
My learned brother has elaborately and exhaustively considered all the issues that came up for determination in this Appeal. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions thereon. I have nothing more useful to add.
On that note, I agree that his appeal is without merit. It is accordingly dismissed. I abide by the order on costs.

N.A. Abass, Esq.-For Appellants


Mrs S.A.A. Fiade-For Respondents

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